Abstract: The study assesses the religious paradox of Amotekun as a typology of community policing outfit in the South-Western States of Nigeria. Amotekun was created by the state governments out of a perceived failure of the Nigerian government to provide security and protection through the regular police force in the south-western states which are prone to serious insecurity challenges due to their populations’ outburst, economic realities and peculiar social environments. Second, the study addresses the dispute about the name and biblical (or religious) source for Amotekun which suggests a heightened religious sensitivity and debates leading to motivation for a viable area of intellectual research. The study is based on a critical historical review of extant literature, participant observation and personal interviews. The paper argues that it would not be easy to deny the irreligious and religiousness of Amotekun as a typology of a community policing outfit.

Keywords: amotekun; community policing; paradox; South-Western; Nigeria

I. Introduction

One of the prevalent practices of policing to reach the grassroots in many nations of the world today is community policing (COP). The establishment of community-initiated policing mechanisms in most cases is as a result of the failure of the state to provide security and protection in the face of growing crime rates among communities (Kappeler and Gaines, 2009). This is why such an enterprise enjoys significant degrees of legitimacy and supports from the communities.

The latest in Nigeria as regard COP is the establishment of “Amotekun” as a new traditional community policing outfit by the six south-western states (Lagos, Ogun, Oyo, Ondo, Osun and Ekiti) of Nigeria (Olubade, Olushola and Ogunnoiki, 2020:54). Setting aside their political divides to curb rising insecurity challenges in the southwest states, the governors met in June 2019 in Ibadan, Oyo State and established the “Operation Amotekun”. The six southwest states are occupied by the Yoruba people (one of the three major ethnic groups in Nigeria) created from the defunct Western Region of Nigeria, but under the present political dispensation, they are grouped under the southwest geopolitical zone (Dakwat and Osisiogu, 2020). Although the establishment of Amotekun was opposed by many on constitutional and religious grounds and accused of being politically and religiously motivated, it afterwards received legislative backings from the various benefiting states’ legislative houses (known as “Houses of Assemblies”) (Dakwat and Osisiogu, 2020).

Most critics, especially Muslims have argued that the establishment of Amotekun is religiously rooted and politically motivated. Some Muslim clerics have argued that Amotekun is a Christian security outfit aimed at Christianizing the entire southwest of Nigeria at the detriment of Islam (Dakwat and Osisiogu, 2020). Thus, with Amotekun now arguably taking on the path of ethno-religious dimension, it becomes paramount to examine its religious paradox and the implications for the states in particular and the Nigerian state in general. In any event, after arguing for Amotekun's irreligion on the one hand and its religiousness on the
other, this research argued for a reform in the current federal policing system in the South-West states and the Nigerian state as a whole.

II. Review of Literature

2.1 Meaning of Community Policing (COP)
According to Brogden (2005), community policing does not have a straightforward and coherent definition rather, it manifests itself in various ways around the globe. Brogden interpret COP to mean a model and style of policing regarding local community needs and challenges, especially in the context of failed and transitional societies (Brogden, 2005). However, there are pyramids of challenges that have been identified by other scholars that occur when western styles of policing are forced in different social, economic and political contexts (Brogden, 2005). While an internationally definition or description of community policing is not possible, Brogden mentioned its core features to include problem-solving, commitment to policing, and community collaborations (Brogden, 2005). Therefore, the concept of community policing may be vaguely articulated and often perceived to be a philosophy rather than a body or an ideas or a specified strategy. Casey (2010) on the other hand, recognizes community policing as a philosophy as well as a strategy which seeks to develop closer police community collaborations along the line of restructuring police establishments as well as transforming police practice (p.55). Here, efforts to build confidence between police and citizens are seemingly common to different community policing initiatives and thus, facilitate partnership and problem-solving methods in handling crime and insecurity. However, community policing has not been applied uniformly around nations of the world despite some identified universal components and practices.

2.2 Criticism of Community Policing (COP)
One of the criticisms of COP is that in its community participation it mobilizes only the small segments of the local population which by implication does not necessarily reflect a broader values and concerns. Four basic styles of policing culture identified by Casey (2010) with which community policing can be enforced are:
(1) Anglo-Industrialized where community policing ought to emerge in response to factors such as changing conditions of crime, diversifying communities that required more localized responses, and increasing demands for police accountability;
(2) Continental Europe where “community” is perceived exclusively in geographic neighbourhood terms;
(3) Developing and transitional where community policing initiatives have been proposed as part of wider democratic reforms and have become core aspects of funded development programmes; and
(4) Centralized regimes where for instance in China, there is significant emphasis upon collective responsibility for governance and policing is based upon a philosophy of for the community and by the community (Casey, 2010).

2.3 Typology of Informal Policing Structures
Alemika and Chukwuma (2007) opined that there are different non-state groups and informal policing structures which provide security at the local level. While they raise some worries, especially in their adoption of mob justice and in their sheer duplication, they also present opportunities for programmatic intervention in communities. Four different types of informal policing structures identified include: religious, ethnic, state-sponsored and community/neighbourhood watch. While these outfits are often informal concerning the state, they are core segments of lived experience for many communities. Indeed, they are often
founded in culture and are part of traditional criminal justice systems of the people. According to Alemika and Chukwuma (2007), the Nigeria Police Force (NPF) is not opposed to the formation and activities of community-initiated policing as long as such outfits register with the police, ensure that members are screened by the police, guarantee that members do not bear arms, and suspects are not detained by them, but are handed over to the regular police for prosecution (Alemika and Chukwuma, 2007).

2.4 Reason for Community Policing

Addressing the problem of imbalances in the police formation in Sierra Leone, Baker (2008) wrote that the state police during the era of the civil war in that country was politicized and used as tools by the state to perpetuate serious human rights abuses. Hence, in the post-war era a new strategy for overcoming further mistrust which had earlier developed between citizens and the state police was adopted for a community policing concept with financial assistance from the Department for International Development (DFID). Thus in 1999, a formidable police community forums, known as Police Local Partnership Boards (PLPBs) were created that is made up of representatives of local groups who are in collaboration with the newly-established Community Relations Offices. Recognizably, the PLPBs became famous because it identified with the local communities intending to increase security in the country. The operations of PLPBs intensified the flow of intelligence; complimented state police manpower by providing informants, night patrols, criminal investigators, mediators in civil dispute and action teams for tackling local disputes; and supplemented police resources such as providing fuel or food for night patrols (Brogden, 2005). However, with all these healthy characteristics, the PLPBs has been accused of being undemocratic, having been dominated by only the educated and influential members of the communities.

In his opinion, Brogden (2005) remarked that in nations marked by increasing crime rates, weak judicial institutions, and low economic investment, and police reform community policing has become an alternative strategy for effecting social change and acting as a catalyst for development.

2.5 Community Policing Models and Support Strategies

For Brogden (2005), a wider range of disparate strategies are incorporated within the community policing rubric. In practice, Brogden however, identifies three core programmes that are central to exported community policing models, they are: neighbourhood watch schemes, community forums, and problem-solving mechanisms. Remarkably, in the present era donor interests and customer demands are the driving mechanism in exporting policing practices. It is also worthy of note according to Brogden, that the international community and financial institutions such as the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU), the International Monetary Fund's (IMF) and the World Bank (WB) are increasingly making economic assistance conditional upon the reform of policing in a community policing context (Brogden, 2005).

Davis, Henderson and Merrick (2003) examines community policing strategies in Brazil, Haiti, Uganda and South Africa and argue that there is no single and uniform practice of community policing. They identify some major factors that influence the nature of community policing and the success of its application at the levels of community cohesion in these countries to include: centralization of the police, levels of respect for the police amongst the population, and existing networks of community organization (Davis, Henderson and Merrick, 2003). It is universally agreed that in Western democracies the basic elements of community policing are decentralization of authority and patrol strategies designed to promote communication; problem-oriented policing; public participation in the setting of policy priorities; and empowering communities to help solve their own crime problems (Deosaran, 2007). Community policing which has been exported to different countries has
assumed different forms that are widely influenced by some elements within the local context including community, a strong network of community, respect for the law, centralization of the police, and technological development.

Writing on the Central and Eastern European states who experienced totalitarian governments and repressive policing, Ferreira (1996) provided a discussion of the academic and policy debates regarding the efficiency of community policing in which he concludes that, despite the many criticisms directed at it, community policing still has the potential to re-establish the integrity of the police. Ferreira identifies divergent models of community policing to include: crime prevention and peace preservation; communications policing; and community-building policing. Those who argue for community policing do so on the ground that community policing tends to ensure a transparent and accountable police force that is proactive and preventative in its approach to crime. Notably, a democratic enabling environment, where the police and the community cooperate in an equal, trusting collaboration is a sine qua non for an effective community policing.

On the Nigeria Police Force (NPF), Onwudiwe (2009) asserts that it suffers from a poor relationship with citizens and this can be seen from its hostility and distrust which is as a result of its historical legacy of coercion and oppression. Being a state formation, the NPF during the colonial period was employed as a state tool and this has continued to date. The police were transformed into a unitary, militarized and centralized force against fierce opposition from local authorities. Onwudiwe (2009), however, recommends that, despite this legacy, community policing remains suitable in the Nigerian context in so far, they are registered with the police, submit to police screening, remains unarmed, and do not detain suspects in their custody.

III. Research Methods

The study is a qualitative research based on phenomenological approach and a critical historical review of extant literature, using the tools of participant observation and personal interviews. At the level of the phenomenological approach, the study utilized unstructured interviews to gather information from community leaders, government officials, politicians, religious leaders and members of the Amotekun corps as well as members of the Nigeria Police Force. At the literature review level, many related literatures were consulted and reviewed to historically trace the history, theory and praxis of community policing in Nigeria and other countries of the world.

The data collected was used to broaden the knowledge about the subject and to address the dispute about the name and religious source for Amotekun which suggests a heightened religious sensitivity and debates leading to motivation for a viable area of intellectual research.

IV. Result and Discussion

4.1 Amotekun as a Typology of Community Policing

According to Wilson and Reeder (2005), Amotekun in English is a leopard. In Yoruba “Amotekun” pronounced as “Ah-moh-teh-kun” literally means “One who knows as Ekun” where “Ekun” means tiger (Joab-Peterside, 2020:44). It has an average body mass weighing between 60kg and 70kg and standing about two-thirds of a meter tall at the shoulder making it the second biggest African cat after the lion (Bothma and Riche, 1984; Grohe, et al, 2018; Wozencraft, 2005). Accordingly, “the debate of whether or not the word “Amotekun” refers to the Cheetah or Leopard since the formation of the security outfit in Nigeria has left questions hanging about the dying culture and tradition of passing down quality Yoruba language from one generation to another” (Oikhala, 2020).
Amotekun is a security outfit based in the six states of southwest Nigeria. It was launched in January 2020 in Ibadan being the outcome of the six governors’ regional security summit held in Ibadan, Oyo State in June 2019 to curb the prevalent insecurities in the southwest region. The establishment of the security outfit was subject to the decision by all the six states through the Development Agenda for Western Nigeria Commission (DAWN) (Grohe, et al, 2018). The six states in the southwest that collectively created Amotekun as a community policing outfit are Lagos, Oyo, Ondo, Osun, Ogun and Ekiti States. In support of the outfit, all the six states contributed twenty vehicles each, except Oyo that contributed thirty-three vehicles, in order to assist the operatives in carrying out their duties. The states also donated a hundred units of motorcycles each, communication and security gadgets (Grohe, et al, 2018: 16). The operatives of Amotekun are made up of local hunters, Oodua People Congress (OPC), Agbekoya (Yoruba local political group), Nigeria Security and Civil Defense Corps (NSCDC) and vigilante groups. The headquarters of “Operation Amotekun” is located in Ibadan, the Oyo State capital. Amotekun is created to assist the state police, other security agencies and traditional rulers in combating terrorism, banditry, armed robbery, kidnapping including the settlement of disagreements between herdsmen and farmers in the states (Chukwuka, 2020). The operatives of Amotekun are billed to carry Dane guns and bows and arrows for their day to day operations just like the local hunters.

In the Amotekun logo, an image of a prancing and angry leopard in its full flight is highlighted. This represents “Zero tolerance to crime” in the region. Despite oppositions, the six southwest governors were persistence in insisting that there was no going back on Amotekun. They, however, conceded that the security outfit was not a regional but state-based security outfit in conformity with community policing structure which is not alien to the Nigeria police. In this wise, the various State Houses of Assembly in the South West, therefore, set to task and the bill for a law to establish the State Security Network Agency and Amotekun Corps was passed into law (Brogden, 2005). By legalizing Amotekun, the lawmakers re-assured the people of the states that Amotekun would reduce criminalities drastically in the states.

4.2 The Religious Paradox of Amotekun

A paradox is an illogical assertion that comprises a self-contradiction of which at least; a person has a particular feeling to assent because it is supported by one type of recognized epistemic authority (Onwudiwe, 2009; Bagger, 2005). Paradoxes are usually adopted as the basis for various techniques of self-transformation by critics and scholars of religion (Abogunrin, 2001). Hence, a naturalistic explanation of religion’s propensity to cultivate and perpetuate a paradox becomes a sin qua non in the current discourse. In discussing the religious paradox of Amotekun one of the uses of paradox comes to mind, that is, Scepticism. Scepticism in this sense cultivates the appearance of contradiction in order to divest a person of judgments and attachments altogether (Robison, 2018). For example, it is hypothetical that scholars’ attitudes toward paradox reflect their attitudes toward the external demarcation of whatever social group that most preoccupies them. Thus, persons who are afraid to cross the boundary of their social group discover paradox to be offensive and use paradox in ascetical context (Bagger, 2005). On the other hand, persons who find the controlled incorporation of outsiders so enriching usually locate paradox in the domain of revelation.

On the current discourse, critics mainly premised their arguments on the presupposition that the six south-western states of Nigeria founded the community policing outfit called “Amotekun” along the religious divide. According to them, the idea of Amotekun is rooted in the Christian Bible book of Jeremiah (5:6) where it is prophesized as follows: Therefore a lion from the forest shall slay them; a wolf from the desert shall destroy them. A leopard is watching against their cities, everyone who goes out of them shall be torn in pieces; because their transgressions are many, their apostasies are great (RSV).
The above claim is evident in the statements of the Muslim Rights Concern (MURIC) and Arewa Consultative Forum (ACF) who argued that Amotekun has its origin in the Christian Bible and that it would not be possible for Muslims to be a part of the security outfit (Fashagba, 2021). According to the MURIC director, the phrase, “a leopard shall guard over their city” in Jeremiah 5:6 implies that Amotekun is mentioned and rooted in Christianity. Thus, Muslims have gone further to argue that the initiators of Amotekun adopted the name from the Bible deliberately to score a religious point (Personal interview with David Murdock, 2020). For this reason, Muslims critics are calling on the governors of the southwest states to rename the security outfit to accommodate other religions since Nigeria is a multi-religious state.

It becomes necessary, therefore, to do a little theological exposition on Jeremiah 6:5 “…a lion from the forest shall slay them; a wolf from the desert shall destroy them. A leopard is watching against their cities…” since this is the ‘kpim’ (principal premise) of opponents’ criticism. An exposition of Jeremiah 6:5 clearly shows that the lion, wolf and leopard mentioned in the passage were pictures that point to the coming invaders to Israel. Perhaps, Prophet Jeremiah pictured Jerusalem and other cities of Judah desolate and handed over to wild animals such that were described in the passage. It indicated that the coming war of judgment on Judah and Jerusalem tend to send them back to much more primitive times.

Among other things, the passage could also be interpreted to mean the followings:

i. The lion symbolizes firmness and strength; the desert wolf represents ravenousness, and the leopard represents swiftness. According to Feinberg (1986), all of these traits represent the Babylonian empire (Lagae, 2020). As Trapp (2000) puts it, Nebuchadnezzar is called a lion for his cruelty, a wolf for his voracity, and a leopard for his slyness and swiftness. Looking back to history, Ryken (2001) recalled that many cities of Judah were destroyed at the beginning of the sixth century B.C. and never again occupied till date. Others were destroyed and reoccupied after a long period of abandonment (Effinger, 2018; Ryken, 2021).

ii. When the Israelites came into the Promised Land because of their faithful and obedience dispositions to God, God used nature to fight for them. In Deuteronomy 7: 20 and Joshua 24:12 it is on record, that God sent the hornet to chase away Israel’s enemies, whereas, the same God sent nature against Israel because of her rebellious attitudes.

iii. In Leviticus 26:22 God promised to punish Israel because of her disobedience. God said he would send wild animals to rob them and their children, including destroying their livestock and decrease their population. Thus, Jeremiah foresaw the fulfillment of this warning.

From the above explanation, one could understand that even the bible never categorically mentioned that the “Leopard shall watch over the Yoruba cities”. However, apart from the leopard, different animals were mentioned in the bible for different reasons, animals like Lion, bear, scorpion, dove, wolf, sheep, serpent, goat, dragon, calf, horse, eagle, and others were all mentioned at one particular time or the other in the bible. Further research into the Bible also revealed that “leopard” is mentioned eight times in the Bible where the leopard is referred to as an animal met for security purposes (Effinger, 2018). The Bible passage alone signifies the fact that a leopard can be used to watch over a city, hence the name Amotekun can be considered most appropriate without any religious sentiments attached. Traditionally speaking, the leopard is a wild animal which is very strong and has the properties of watchfulness; it is always alert, careful and watchful (Personal interview with Anita Okene, 2020). This may be one of the reasons the name “Amotekun” was adopted for the security operations, not necessarily because of its religious or biblical significance. More so, a clear analysis of the Amotekun logo shows that it has no religious colouration, except that the symbol of the ori olokun (the Yoruba Signature) standing on the shield which is interpreted to mean the unity of the Yoruba ethnic group.
Although some Christians have argued that Jeremiah 5:6 could be regarded as a fulfillment of Prophet Jeremiah’s prophecy for the Yoruba people hence it could be considered that the formation of Amotekun is divinely motivated using the south-west governors as instruments (Personal interview with Ambrose Akinnola, 2020). It is claimed by some Yoruba descendants that though, the governors may not be aware of the existence of this powerful prophecy of Jeremiah in the Bible, it is believed that God who hates injustice puts the idea of Amotekun into their minds. For some persons, Amotekun is not only legally rooted as a community policing outfit; it is also, by the Christian standard also rooted in the Bible (Personal interview with Jose Akpuh, 2020). In another argument, Muslims have capitalized on the statement by the Christian Association of Nigeria (CAN) after its representatives in the states visited and commended the proponents of Amotekun and promised to support it with prayers.

4.3 Implications

While religion is foundational and fundamental to human rights and freedom, it is also problematic in the sense that diverse and complex human society is embedded in social practices that are not easily divided into religious and irreligious paradigms (Harisah, Irawan & Iskandar, 2019). For instance, the United Nations (UN) does not define religion according to a group or social identity. As can be seen in the Defamation of Religious debate at the UN between 1999 and 2011, religion was defined as an individual rather than group right (Muhammadin, 2020). This means, that, the broad concepts of religion often obscure identity and hide an imperialistic organization of society (Nst, 2022). The establishment of Amotekun as a typology of COP outfit by the six southwest states governors is a clear case of the full exercise of their human, constitutional, political and executive rights. Hence, stopping Amotekun is a denial of the rights of the people of the southwest including compromising their protection and security.

Stopping Amotekun also amounts to an inconsistency that is intolerable from the southwest people that have suffered terrible outrage in the hands of old, but particularly relatively new threats roughly identified with specific groups of other Nigerians (Muhammadin, 2020). While some persons may argue that human rights and religion need one another, it is still unclear whether they hinder each other more than they help. This paradox is evident in the context of the criticisms of Amotekun in relation to the UN and Non-Governmental organizations (NGOs) where the term “religion” is a strategic concept that carries both positive and negative associations in human rights discourse. This is why it is said that many of the world’s greatest advocates for social justice come from religion (Power-Forde, 2016). In this sense, the abstract concept of religion does a lot of work in social groups, where religion is linked to human freedom and individual rights and becomes, in effect, an official protective category for theoretical rights rather than lived realities.

Even more unseen and unacknowledged, the term religion also hides an imperialistic organization of the world, built from colonial forces and power that sought to capture non-western societies. Arguably, therefore, most concepts of civil society support cultures that separate religion from politics and markets (Asuquo, 2019). To create such sectors in society is to refuse the cultural reality of many non-western religious and cultural traditions that do not operate on such divisions. It is here one can see the greatest problem of religion, that is, the false religious-secular division that privileges the western elite and its ordering of reality in human society (Nst, 2022). In applying this awareness shown above to the Amotekun religious paradox, it could be asserted that critics of Amotekun, especially the northern Muslims are seeking attention, recognition, sympathy and relevance from the Yoruba Muslims and Christians without objectively referring to the precedence already set by the north in the establishment of Hisbah (Islamic or Sharia police) for instance (Nwanaju, 2012). While
disassociating Amotekun from any religious affiliation, some Yoruba descents have asserted that in Yoruba land emphasis on religion is paramount.

Besides Christianity and Islam, it is postulated in the sense of their traditional religion, that the Yoruba people have four hundred and one deities with none of them been associated with Amotekun. Historically speaking, the issues of religion and irreligion have been on the front burner before and after Nigeria independence. Specifically, it can be dated far back to the colonial period between the 1940s and 1950s as Nigeria was getting ready for her post-colonial constitution. The issue came to a climax when the Constitution Drafting Committee (CDC) formed commenced work in 1975 when a section of the draft constitution was proposed thus: “Nigeria is one and indivisible sovereign republic, secular, democratic and social” (Ottuh & Aitufe, 2014 p.14). The contention by the Muslims was whether the term, “secular” implies religion or secularism (irreligion). Perhaps Amotekun in the southwestern geopolitical zone of the country has revived similar debate in the contexts of religion and politics. Possibly, therefore, the illustrative idea of the kind of federalism and thus, restructuring agenda that would work within the context of Nigeria has found itself a basis.

On the other hand, it is political because it is politicized, hence the Amotekun stem criticism. The Amotekun initiative has now become a poster innovation for the improvisation around the restructuring agenda, a tactically diplomatic and robust response to the deficiency in the unitary system of governance in the country currently. Admittedly, Amotekun is a bold move to deepen the long-desired wish of mass in the southwest region to create greater political and economic distance between the region and Nigeria. While this is not a crime, it does subvert the state’s capacity to do its job better. Amotekun is an attempt to remind the nation of the existence of a solid political bloc that can think as one and chart a course to a future that is consistent with its interests.

While Amotekun is irreligious, the problem of insecurity in Nigeria is now religious and political issues. It is religious because most Nigerians believe that the security of human beings is in the hands of God the Creator. In recent times, the security structures of Nigeria have been seriously weakened armed bandits and other powers that be (Ottuh, 2012). This means that no Nigerian or foreigner was safe. For example, on January 17, 2020, the Emir of Potiskum, Umara Bauya in Yobe State narrowly escaped death in a banditry attack that claimed a hundred lives, thirty of who were his aides. Similar attacks were vested on the Ooni of Ife, Oba of Lagos and Olubadan of Ibadan same period. Many have clamoured in their analysis of the situations that if an Amotekun had been present in that part of the country, it would have been impossible to launch such tragic attacks on these Nigerian eminent personalities. It is therefore obvious, that the likelihood of this happening is one of the reasons behind the setting up of Amotekun as a COP outfit in the southwestern states. Amotekun is an innovation that would finally make the south-west region safe to create the enabling environment for the economic development of the southwest states (Marlina, 2022).

Admittedly, Amotekun is a bold move to deepen the long-desired wish of mass in the southwest region to create greater political and economic distance between the region and Nigeria. While this is not a crime, it does subvert the state’s capacity to do its job better. Amotekun is an attempt to remind the nation of the existence of a solid political bloc that can think as one and chart a course to a future that is consistent with its interests. Most states in the country have some type of vigilante or the other, choking the nation with nebulous policing, while those with legitimate policing responsibility retreated under pressure, incompetence and loss of popular support. Community policing has become the wand waved at every failure of the state to protect citizens. Two obvious implications are certain. First, is that the depressing realization that all the vigilante outfits, the regular police and other security agencies put together will not be going to make Nigerians more secured and safe. Second, Amotekun is unlikely to add one minute of sleep to Nigerians who are exposed to types and levels of insecurity they have never known until now.
V. Conclusion

The study has shown that community policing (COP) has become the wand waved at every failure of the state to protect citizens. Most states in the country have some type of vigilante or the other, choking the nation with nebulous policing, while those with legitimate policing responsibility retreated under pressure, incompetence and loss of popular support.

Amotekun is thus a smart creation designed to fill gaps and secures the lives and properties of the Yoruba people. Amotekun is not a regional armed force, nor a regional police but a traditional COP outfit set up by the six southwest states to protect and secure their citizens. It functions within the existing official security structures, though manned by many retired security personnel and hunters from the states. Admittedly, therefore, Amotekun as a community-oriented policing should be seen as a novel development in Nigeria; it is not a Christian security outfit neither is it affiliated to any known religion in or outside Nigeria, and its foundation is timely and it is worthy of emulation by other states in Nigeria and other Africa nations. The study however, leads to the appreciation of the religious, moral, political, and socio-cultural significance of Amotekun as a community policing outfit in the South-Western states of Nigeria.

The arguments advanced in this study are not outright advocating for the establishment of an extra-political or independent state structure to keep peace in subsections of the Nigerian society; neither does the researcher advocates for the possible subverting of existing federal social structures. Amotekun should demonstrate a positive attitudinal disposition towards the public to earn their trust and confidence in carrying out its operations.

It is also recommended that other states or geopolitical zones of the Federation should float similar community policing outfit as this will go a long way in complementing the conventional policing. In doing this, the corporate existence of Nigeria as a unified single State should be uppermost in their minds and without any form of religious sentiment.

References


